Given that the phenomenon of capture of public programs by sections the population is rampant in developing countries, households can indulge in a strategy to improve their participating in public programs by bribing the suppliers of such programs. This is an important issue affecting both the supply of local public goods and the incidence of corruption. To the best of our knowledge there is no analysis of the impact of bribery on participating in a local public goods program, anywhere. Using a unique data set for rural
India this paper addresses the question of whether households bribe elected officials responsible for assuring such supply to improve their access to local public goods. We find considerable evidence of such bribing. We also model the welfare effects of such bribing on groups of households as well as the impact of bribery on aggregate welfare. Several policy conclusions are advanced.
Indien ist auf dem Weg, eine wirtschaftliche und politische Großmacht zu werden.
Dies kann nur gelingen, sofern Indien es schafft, seine vielfältigen Herausforderungen zu meistern. Eines der größten ungelösten Probleme ist die Korruption.
Transparency and fighting corruption – Indian Instruments and insights
Presentation made in the Consultation on Transparency and Corruption organized by EMW and the Mission Academy at the University of Hamburg, Germany 2 – 3 March 2010 by Rev. Asir Ebenezer (Presbyter-onlien, CSI Diocese of Madras) Officiating General Secretary, National Council of Churches in India (email@example.com).
Does political connections and affiliation affect allocation of benefits in the Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: Evidence from West Bengal, India: SSRN-id2262533